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Notes on the Future of the Legal Profession
in the United States: The Key Roles of
Corporate Law Firms and Urban Law Schools
BRYANT G. GARTH†
INTRODUCTION
Anxiety over the future of the U.S. legal profession comes
in large part from the fear that law school enrollment will
not return to the levels of the prosperous years before the
“bubble” burst in 2010. The first year class, beginning in
2009, totaled 51,646, the largest ever.1 The current class,
beginning in 2016, is 37,107, which goes back to the 1973
level.2 Commentators and scholars adduce a number of
reasons why the “new normal” will be reduced law school
attendance, which is tied to a decline in the attractiveness
and prestige of the legal profession.3 Whether the doomsday
scenarios are correct or not, the numbers are disappointing
and consequential to law schools largely dependent on

† Chancellor’s Professor of Law, University of California, Irvine; Affiliated
Research Professor, American Bar Foundation.
1. Section of Legal Educ. and Admissions to the Bar, Enrollment and Degrees
Awarded
1963–2012
Academic
Years,
A.B.A.,
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_a
nd_admissions_to_the_bar/statistics/enrollment_degrees_awarded.authcheckda
m.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 2017).
2. Id.; Section of Legal Educ. and Admissions to the Bar, 2016 Standard 509
Information
Report
Data
Overview,
A.B.A.,
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_a
nd_admissions_to_the_bar/statistics/2016_standard_509_data_overview.authch
eckdam.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 2017).
3. E.g., Deborah Jones Merritt, What Happened to the Class of 2010?
Empirical Evidence of Structural Change in the Legal Profession, 2015 MICH. ST.
L. REV. 1043.
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tuition. Low numbers have led to lay-offs, early retirements,
and frozen salaries in many cases. Law schools able to do so
have also redoubled efforts to find new sources of revenue—
especially through increased foreign LL.M. enrollments—
and there are also unresolved issues about how to absorb the
increased numbers of LL.M. students. There is no doubt that
the short-term adjustments have been painful, and they have
been exacerbated by efforts to keep entering credentials as
high as possible for U.S. News rankings purposes.
The question about the future numbers of law students
is important, but more fundamental is the question of
whether there is a major shift in the attractiveness of legal
education or simply a relative decline, which may be short
term, in the number of applicants and enrollees to law school.
We do not have solid research yet to understand why the
profession appears to be less attractive today than in the
recent and perhaps longer term past. The Association of
American Law Schools (AALS) has begun a research project,
entitled “Before the J.D.,” which aims to explore the reasons
for what the AALS sees as a long-term decline in law school
applications going back to the period after World War II. 4
The project focuses on the attitudes and choices that
undergraduates make in deciding their career direction.5 The
Law School Admission Council (LSAC) has also focused
attention on this situation with a research report on the
attitudes of undergraduates to law school.6
The reaction of the ABA Section on Legal Education is
particularly notable. Reversing an antitrust-inspired policy
not to restrict entry into the legal profession by limiting law

4. Barbara Elenbaas, Jeff Allum: Before the JD, ASS’N OF AM. L. SCHS.,
https://www.aals.org/about/publications/newsletters/aals-news-fall-2016/jeffallum-before-the-jd/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2017).
5. Id.
6. ANN GALLAGHER & PHIL HANDWERK, BEHIND THE DATA: COMPARING LAW
SCHOOL APPLICANTS TO OTHER COLLEGE FRESHMEN (2012), http://www.lsac.org/
flipbooks/behindthedata/#/1/.
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school accreditation, the new approach of the Section on
Legal Education takes a much tougher stance on schools
with low bar passage stemming from low entry credentials.7
They must restrict attrition to lower than twenty percent on
the one hand, and on the other hand, seventy-five percent of
the graduates must pass the bar within two years of
graduation.8 “Consumer choice” and a market-based
approach to law school regulation may no longer be the
mantra. The assumption of the ABA Section on Legal
Education appears to be that students with relatively weak
credentials are making bad choices to attend law school, and
the solution is to penalize law schools that admit them.9 As
evidenced by the most recent bar results in California,
discussed below, the consequences may be quite severe if the
rule goes into effect.
Yet loan defaults are still rare and most students, as
reported in the data from the After the JD Project and the
more recent NALP Foundation data, are, in retrospect,
satisfied with their decision to attend law school.10 The
prevailing narrative is very pessimistic about the future of
law schools, but the data is far from clear.11 This Symposium
organized by the University at Buffalo School of Law focuses
7. Memorandum from the Hon. Rebecca White Berch & Barry A. Currier to
Interested Persons and Entities (Mar. 25, 2016), http://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admissions_to_the_bar/co
uncil_reports_and_resolutions/20160325_notice_and_comment_memo.authchec
kdam.pdf.
8. Id.
9. See id.
10. Rebecca Sandefur, Bryant G. Garth & Joyce Sterling, Financing Legal
Education—The View Twelve Years out of Law School, in AFTER THE JD III: THIRD
RESULTS FROM A NATIONAL STUDY OF LEGAL CAREERS 79 (2014); Ronit Dinovitzer,
Bryant G. Garth & Joyce S. Sterling, Buyers’ Remorse? An Empirical Assessment
of the Desirability of a Lawyer Career, 63 J. LEGAL EDUC. 211 (2013). The NAPL
Foundation data comes from surveys submitted by law schools which the
Foundation then aggregates.
11. Michael Simcovic & Frank McIntyre, The Economic Value of a Law
Degree, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 249, 280 n.41 (2014).
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on the future of law school in light of this uncertain context.
There is no way to divine the future of the legal
profession or law schools, but I hope to use this opportunity
to clarify some of the issues of the debate. I do not pretend to
know whether law school applications will ever return to the
levels of the period prior to 2010, whether the market for
legal services at the individual or corporate level is shrinking
or growing over time, and how that relates to law school
applications. Nor do I have prescriptions to offer to attract
people to law school. I do hope to clarify the debate through
a historical and sociological perspective that is missing from
most of the analyses.
In particular, I want to focus on the question of the
relative attractiveness of legal careers to two basic groups
that are separable but also overlap. The first is the group of
individuals who choose to attend law school as a classic step
in upward mobility. The second is those with very strong
educational credentials who attend law school as a ticket into
a career of high status and prospects for high pay. In contrast
to the upward mobility project, we can call this the elite
reproduction project. The upward mobility project is loosely
connected with the role of urban law schools not high in the
law school rankings. The elite reproduction project links to
the large corporate law firms.
The history of the U.S. legal profession has blended
together elites and strivers for upward mobility, but the
combination has not always been free of tension.12 Today, the
issue is whether law is seen as playing either of these roles,
and, if not, whether it will again in the future. My thesis is
that if law is still central to the elite reproduction role and
the upward mobility role, the position of law and lawyers in
the United States will remain strong. There may be ebbs and
flows in applications to law school and fluctuations in the

12. See generally LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW (3d ed.
2005).
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demand for legal services, but there is no long-term crisis.
The corporate law firm is the key to the elite
reproduction role because of its historical position at the top
of the legal profession and its close connection to economic
and political power. The urban law school is the key to the
upward mobility project because of its traditional position
not only in providing access but also in situating graduates
in the political and social ecology of our major cities. Neither
institution is free from challenge, and there are challenges
today. The challenges tend to come in a particular way. First,
the elite position of the bar faces attack. Then the relatively
elite schools and their supporters turn the attack on the
lower status schools. Both sides need each other, but the
relationship is not always peaceful.
This Article will separate each of these legal career
strategies and institutional contexts and root them in the
historical structure of the legal field and the fields of
economic and state power. I use the term strategies
consistent with Pierre Bourdieu’s sociological approach.13
This approach looks not at whether rational actors choose to
go to law school, but rather whether ambitious individuals
seeking upward mobility or affirming elite status see law
school as the natural choice (or at least one of them) for
themselves and their circle of friends and acquaintances. The
question is whether the choice of law school appears to be
reasonable and possible for individuals from the perspective
of their social world. It appears reasonable and possible not
because of an ad hoc calculation of costs and benefits, but
because a large number of individuals have internalized a
view of the world in which lawyers occupy influential
positions, garner respect, and prosper economically. The
view comes from many sources, including the media, the
legal profession, and such factors as seeing how their parents

13. These terms are explained in PIERRE BOURDIEU & LOÏC J.D. WACQUANT,
AN INVITATION TO REFLEXIVE SOCIOLOGY 9–11 (1992).

GARTH 65.2

292

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65

and social world respond to individuals identified as lawyers.
The view has a long history in the United States, but it is not
inevitable.
Within the structural sociology inspired by Bourdieu, the
field refers to a semi-autonomous space in which individuals
compete for the rewards generated by the field. From that
perspective, the question is whether the strategy of going to
law school makes sense if one seeks to become a player in
fields of economic or political power. The attractiveness of the
law degree depends on individuals believing that the
investment in law will continue to be rewarded in status or
material rewards in those fields. The embeddedness of law
graduates in economic and political power is a key part of
that attraction. That embeddedness is part of a long history
producing a legal field with particular characteristics that
both endure and evolve. The corporate law firm late in the
nineteenth century became the organization central to elite
lawyer
careers—the
so-called
“lawyer-statesperson”
operating at the intersection of professional leadership,
economic power, and state power.14 The institution of the
corporate law firm is closely connected to elite law schools.
The institution key to the upward mobility project is the
urban law school accessible originally to those who were not
welcome in the elite schools or the corporate law firms.15 The
urban law school is a product of the boom in law schools late
in the nineteenth and early in the twentieth century—
despite the hostility of the institutions of the organized bar.16
Each of the career paths and the institutions associated
with them have gains and losses in attractiveness in
particular historical periods. This Article will discuss each
14. Yves Dezalay & Bryant Garth, Law, Lawyers, and Empire, in THE
CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW IN AMERICA: THE TWENTIETH CENTURY AND AFTER
(1920– ) 718, 722–723 (Michael Grossberg & Christopher Tomlins eds., 2008).
15. Joyce Sterling, Ronit Dinovitzer & Bryant Garth, The Changing Social
Role of Urban Law Schools, 36 SW. U. L. REV. 389, 389–422 (2007).
16. Id. at 390, 397.
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path and institution in historical perspective, showing how
the law schools and the legal profession have weathered
challenges in the past. The historical challenges to the
corporate law firms within the fields of economic and state
power are therefore quite instructive. As noted above, there
is also a historical relationship between the criticisms of the
corporate law firms and the mobility project. The threat to
the hierarchy at the top unleashes attacks on access at the
lower levels of the hierarchy. The relative elites seek to
enhance the prestige of the legal profession’s “upper” ranks
by purging the “lower” ranks.
As noted at the outset, the stakes involved with law
school enrollment are at one level simply the prosperity of
law schools. The larger debate is the position of lawyers in
the United States, which also relates to the strength of law.
It is easy to see why leaders of the profession today believe
that the decline in the attractiveness of the legal career
threatens the “rule of law.” There is also a more sociological
way to describe the stakes. Success in responding to the
current challenges involves a process of retooling and
absorbing challenges—in other words, containing social
change, whether progressive or reactionary—from outside
the law and absorbing them into the fabric of the law.
Absorbing into the fabric of law is also the reproduction with
moderate change of both the institutions and hierarchies of
the field.
This Article will proceed in four parts after this
introduction. Part I will discuss the major concerns that
characterize the current nervousness about the future of the
legal profession. Part II will focus on the elite reproduction
story and the challenges to corporate law firms over time.
Part III will then focus on the urban law schools, their
historical role, and the challenges they have faced
historically and in the present. Finally, the Conclusion will
again return to what the stakes are for the current challenge.
It will highlight the importance of this competing but
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symbiotic combination of corporate law firms tied to elite law
schools and the upward mobility graduates of the urban law
schools—a relative few of which will gain positions in
corporate law firms.
I. A LITANY OF CONCERNS: THE CURRENT CRISIS
The concerns can be divided into issues about the
expense of law school, the relative decline of corporate law
jobs, and the relative attractiveness of positions competing
with lawyers at the high end of corporate law and involving
careers serving individuals.
With respect to law as an upward mobility career, there
are multiple questions about the value of the law degree with
respect to its cost. Some suggest that only those who get
scholarships or can afford to pay should attend law schools.17
A similar contention is those who accumulate debt at the not
unusual $100,000–150,000 level should attend law school
only if they are confident they will obtain employment at a
corporate law firm, which is a way also to suggest that
prospective lawyers should avoid the lower status law
schools.18 The cost of law school, from this perspective, has
simply gotten too high for the vast majority of students—
those who will not be able to obtain admission to the elite law
schools that can promise corporate law jobs to more than five
to ten percent of their graduates.19 The new focus on bar
passage reinforces this message. The argument is that those
whose test-taking skills are relatively weak as evidenced by
low LSAT scores should not be admitted to law schools in
states where the bar exam is designed to make their entry
extremely difficult, such as California.
A related concern is that the number of corporate law
positions for new graduates is seen to be shrinking. NALP
17. E.g., PAUL CAMPOS, DON’T GO TO LAW SCHOOL (UNLESS) 45, 96, 97 (2012).
18. E.g., BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS 157–58 (2012).
19. See id. at 140.
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statistics show that that the number of new positions has not
returned to the level obtained prior to the 2009 crash.20
There are also a number of individuals who suggest that the
economic returns to small and solo practice are shrinking in
relation to other careers.21 Further, non-traditional
providers
of
legal
services—through
unbundling,
outsourcing, artificial intelligence, e-discovery programs,
and similar technological innovations—threaten the growth
of the demand for legal services by lawyers.22 It is
understandable that potential applicants hoping to move
into professional positions as a way to improve their
economic and social position are shying away from law
school.
There are related concerns about the path of law as elite
reproduction for the so-called best and brightest. If, as
mentioned above, the corporate partner is the embodiment
of the elite of the legal profession, the attractiveness and
prosperity of that position—now including in-house lawyers
as “lawyer-statespersons”23—matters. Articles questioning
the future of “Big Law” and the attractiveness of that
position deter Ivy League and comparable graduates from
law school. The concern that the decline in law school
applicants has come disproportionately from the more elite
undergraduates reflects this dynamic.24 From August 2013,

20. “[F]or the Class of 2015 there were still more than 1,800 fewer entry-level
jobs in large law firms than there were for the Class of 2008.” James G. Leipold
& Judith N. Collins, The Stories Behind the Numbers: Jobs for New Grads Over
More Than Two Decades, NALP BULL., (Dec. 2016), http://www.nalp.org/
1216research.
21. E.g., BENJAMIN H. BARTON, GLASS HALF FULL: THE DECLINE AND REBIRTH
(2015).

OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 4, 47

22. RICHARD SUSSKIND, TOMORROW’S LAWYERS: AN INTRODUCTION
FUTURE (2013).

TO

YOUR

23. See Ben W. Heineman, Jr., The General Counsel as Lawyer-Statesman: A
Blue Paper, HARV. L. SCH. PROGRAM ON THE LEGAL PROF. 5, 13 (2010),
https://clp.law.harvard.edu/assets/General_Counsel_as_Lawyer-Statesman.pdf.
24. Catherine Rampell, Law School Applications Decline, Especially from
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“Across the board, the number of people applying to
matriculate in fall 2012 was 67,700, down about 17 percent
from the number who applied to matriculate in fall 2008
(82,000). The average decline in applicants who graduated
from the ‘elite’ schools was 28 percent.”25
If we posit that many of the individuals fitting this group
aspire to both wealth and an opportunity to become leaders
in political or economic fields, the rise of positions competing
with law relates to this concern. A very recent New Yorker
article, for example, focuses on the “revolving door” between
investment banks and leadership positions in the federal
government.26 The revolving door has long been identified
with lawyers and has been a source of the attractiveness of
elite law.27 To the extent that investment bankers fill that
role, the position of elite law may be endangered. Whatever
the reasons for the attraction, there are numerous articles in
the popular press suggesting that a high percentage of elite
graduates go into investment banking or business
consulting.28
An article in the Washington Monthly, in 2014, noted, for
example, “so many Harvard and Stanford students . . . both
accept and abhor that being recruited by Wall Street or
certain consulting firms has become a measure of how smart
and talented they are.”29 A similar article quotes students
Graduates
of
Elite
Colleges,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Aug.
23,
2013),
https://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/08/23/law-school-applicants-declineespecially-among-grads-of-elite-colleges/?_r=0.
25. Id.
26. Alec MacGillis. The Democrats’ Fight over Finance, NEW YORKER (Nov. 14,
2016),
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/11/14/the-democrats-fightover-finance.
27. See id.
28. E.g., Aimee Groth, Here’s Where Ivy League Students Go When They
Graduate, BUS. INSIDER (June 29, 2012), http://www.businessinsider.com/hereswhere-ivy-league-students-go-when-they-graduate-presentation-2012-6#-3.
29. Amy J. Binder, Why Are Harvard Grads Still Flocking to Wall
Street?,WASH. MONTHLY, Sept.–Oct. 2014, at 53, 56.
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saying, “Everyone treated finance as this elite profession
that smart people did after they graduated, especially people
who aren’t on another more structured path like medical
school or law. . . . It seemed like anybody who’s just
generically intelligent, skilled in the social sciences . . . the
best of the best would go to Wall Street.”30 An article on Yale
College graduates from the class of 2014 shows the
prominence of business consulting and investment
banking.31 A fascinating anthropological study of Princeton
undergraduates and investment banks suggests that the
debate at Princeton today over investment banking is what
it might have been for law a generation ago.32 The question
is whether one should become an investment banker as the
default career choice for the ambitious Ivy League
undergraduate.33
The concerns today are quite strong, therefore, ranging
from the demand for lawyers, the income in relation to
indebtedness, and the relative attractiveness of other elite
careers. The particular manifestations of the crisis are
somewhat different than in the past, but threats to the
position of lawyers are not new. The profession is resilient;
indeed, it is so resilient that we tend to ignore or downplay
earlier threats. The legal field tends to absorb threats in
ways that allow it to reproduce prevailing hierarchies and
the key institutions. We see this especially in the challenges
to the elite status of corporate lawyers closely tied to
economic power and elite law schools.

30. Amanda Terkel, America’s “Brain Drain”: Best and Brightest College
Grads Head for Wall Street, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 16, 2011),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/11/15/brain-drain-college-grads-wallstreet_n_1069424.html (internal quotations omitted).
31. Tyler Foggatt, 2014 Career Paths Revealed, YALE DAILY NEWS (2014),
http://technology.yaledailynews.com/features/2014-careers/.
32. See KAREN HO, LIQUIDATED: AN ETHNOGRAPHY
(2009).
33. See id.

OF

WALL STREET, 43–44
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II. THE CORPORATE LAW FIRM’S HISTORICAL ROLE AND ITS
CHALLENGERS
The corporate law firm late in the nineteenth and early
in the twentieth century came to embody the elite of the legal
profession.34 The firms were, at first, highly criticized as the
hired guns of such robber barons as Andrew Carnegie, J.P.
Morgan, and John D. Rockefeller. But leading lawyers such
as Elihu Root, Philander Knox, John W. Davis, Henry
Stimson, and others overcame much of this criticism by
taking on the position of “lawyer-statesperson.” They
identified themselves with public service, supporting local
reforms, and moving back and forth into presidential
administrations; and even helped to write the rules—notably
antitrust—that regulated and, not incidentally, legitimated
their giant corporate clients. That participation in writing
the rules ensured that the new rules built a demand for their
services that stimulated the need for more corporate lawyers
like themselves. They were also leaders in developing the
philanthropic activities of their clients, exemplified by the
Carnegie Foundation’s investment in international law and
the Peace Palace in The Hague, and by Elihu Root’s Nobel
Peace Prize for work on international arbitration.35
This model started on Wall Street but spread to the
emerging cities of the U.S. continent. Law firm biographies
of, for example, O’Melvany and Myers in Los Angeles,36 and
Baker and Botts in Dallas,37 enumerate the number of

34. Dezalay & Garth, supra note 14, at 722–24.
35. Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth, Constructing a Transatlantic
Marketplace of Disputes on the Symbolic Foundations of International Justice, in
CONTRACTUAL KNOWLEDGE: ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF LEGAL EXPERIMENTATION IN
GLOBAL MARKETS 185, 189, 191–93 (Gregoire Mallard & Jerome Sgard eds.,
2016).
36. See generally 1 WILLIAM WEBB CLARY, HISTORY
O’MELVENY & MYERS, 1885–1965 (1966).

OF THE

LAW FIRM

37. KENNETH J. LIPARTITO & JOSEPH PRATT, BAKER & BOTTS
DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN HOUSTON 6 (2011).

OF

IN THE
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lawyers from those firms who became mayors and in other
ways pillars of their local communities while also staying
close to local and national economic power.
The appeal of the position of “lawyer-statesperson” is
evident. It combined public service, high status, good pay if
not extraordinary wealth, and connections to wealth and
power more generally. And it meant that the key individuals
creating the rules for governance were those who could profit
from the demand for their services that the new rules
created. This place at the intersection of private and public
power allowed corporate lawyers, and those connected to
them, to play a particularly strong and appealing social role.
The importance of lawyers builds the importance of law as
well. Of course, relatively few corporate lawyers became
prominent “lawyer-statespersons,” but successful corporate
lawyers were drawn to and rewarded for their community
activities. The prominent “lawyer-statespersons” enhanced
the reputation and attractiveness of the legal profession
generally.
Within the sociology of organizations and professions,
there is a thriving literature about this role. Neoinstitutional
sociologists talk of professions as institution builders and
recently have noted the particular role of professional service
firms—law
firms,
paradigmatically—as
keys
to
organizational innovation and adaptation both domestically
and globally.38
This historical appeal of law and legal education can be
seen in various sources. As Auerbach noted in his history of
the divided legal profession, the law review editors of
Harvard, Yale, and Columbia as early as the 1920s
overwhelmingly “entered private corporate practice upon
graduation from law school.”39 Historical accounts of

38. See, e.g., W. Richard Scott, Lords of the Dance: Professionals as
Institutional Agents, 29 ORG. STUD. 219, 223–27 (2008).
39. JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN
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government leaders support this pattern. Growing up in the
late 1930s, for example, many of those who became the
leaders in the 1960s and 1970s were inspired by the careers
of Root and Stimson in particular. They were attracted to and
connected to law and corporate law firms even if not all
formally becoming lawyers.
Geoffrey Kabaservice’s book, The Guardians,40 helps
make this point. It describes the careers of Cyrus Vance,
Kingman Brewster, Elliot Richardson, John Lindsay,
McGeorge Bundy, and Paul Moore.41 They were the leaders
of what Kabaservice terms the liberal establishment.42
Vance, Brewster, Richardson, and Lindsay came from
prominent families and went to law school as a kind of
natural career to assert influence and get involved in social
reform.43 They supported each other and dominated major
institutions—Yale College, the Ford Foundation, and politics
including Mayor of New York City.44 The institution that
they would return to between positions was the corporate
law firm, where they could rebuild their wealth and their
staple of private and public connections.
We can hypothesize on the basis of this research that
there was a very strong attraction of the ambitious, talented,
and well-connected into the elite legal world revolving
around corporate law firms, politics, and public service. The
environment on the Ivy League campuses, most likely,
resembled what is so well documented for Princeton today,
except that the default career for the smart and ambitious

MODERN AMERICA 143 (1976).
40. GEOFFREY KABASERVICE, THE GUARDIANS: KINGMAN BREWSTER, HIS
CIRCLE, AND THE RISE OF THE LIBERAL ESTABLISHMENT (2004).
41. Id. passim.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 14–43.
44. Id.
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was then corporate law rather than investment banking.45
The attraction of law graduates into these corporate law
firms was key to the continued status of lawyers, to the role
of law in providing the language of solutions to social
problems, and to building new demand out of those solutions.
Some highly suggestive interviews about the early
careers of leading public interest lawyers support the
persistence of this perspective into the 1960s. Charles
Halpern, interviewed by Thomas Hilbink as part of a
doctoral dissertation on public interest law, reported being
relatively apolitical as an undergraduate at Harvard. 46 He
then attended Yale Law School and went to work at Arnold
and Porter after a federal clerkship.47 He reported that “[h]e
imagined a career of working at a law firm, doing pro bono
work, and taking stints in government.”48 His ambitions
reveal that he had perfectly internalized the hierarchies and
incentives that put U.S. corporate lawyers at the top of the
legal field and brought economic rewards, respect, and
influence over public policy. It was not a cost benefit analysis
but rather following a well-worn path that seemed natural to
those on a path to attaining or reproducing elite status.
Another key individual profiled by Hilbink, Carlyle Hall Jr.,
graduated from Harvard Law School and, in 1969, went to
work for O’Melveny and Myers in Los Angeles.49 He was
attracted to O’Melvany, he said, by Warren Christopher, the
most important partner and one “who had long combined
private lawyering with public service.”50 Hall too was
45. See HO, supra note 32.
46. Thomas Miguel Hilbink, Constructing Cause Lawyering: Professionalism,
Politics, and Social Change in 1960s America, 343 (Jan. 31, 2006) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, N.Y.U.), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? abstract_
id=2417253.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 344.
49. Id. at 347–49.
50. See id. at 347–49.
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following the internalized program of the elite lawyer.
This internalized elite track is not inevitable even if
pretty well-established in the United States. The common
sense of elite undergraduates can change in relation to many
contingencies. Put in sociological terms, the strong position
of corporate lawyers in the field of political and economic
power can be challenged. Other career trajectories can
become more attractive—at least in the short term. One era
of challenge was the Depression and the New Deal. The
courts and Wall Street lawyers were staunch opponents of
the New Deal, in part because of the efforts of the New Deal
to contain business and strengthen the regulatory state.51
There were populist attacks on the Wall Street
establishment.52 The strength of this attack, if sustained,
might have deterred elite undergraduates from corporate
law—seen as the problem, not the potential source of
solutions.
The story of the response to this challenge cannot be
detailed here. It is told well by Ronen Shamir.53 Legal
Realism and the efforts of law professors at Harvard, Yale,
and Columbia, in particular, to support the New Deal warded
off the challenge and absorbed it.54 Rather than weakening
the influence of corporate law firms because of their
opposition to increased state power and ties to oligarchic
economic power, new corporate law firms close to the
regulatory state rejuvenated the corporate law position.55
The New Deal ended up producing more work for corporate
lawyers, and the new institution of the Washington, D.C. law
firm made a new generation excited about the prospects of

51. See RONEN SHAMIR, MANAGING UNCERTAINTY: ELITE LAWYERS IN THE NEW
DEAL 45–46, 67 (1995).
52. See id. at 66–67.
53. See generally id.
54. See id. at 132–33.
55. See id.
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practicing corporate law—in firms like Arnold, Fortas and
Porter, which the Realists created.
Two aspects of this story are important. One is
rebuilding and securing the position of elite corporate
lawyers in and around the government—as natural public
servants in leadership positions. This phenomenon is a key
to attracting elite students into the law schools and then to
corporate law. The other aspect is the demand for corporate
legal services. From the positions in government, elite
lawyers were able to ensure that lawyers participated fully
and thrived from the New Deal and the activist state that
continued after the 1930s, which then allowed the profession
to grow to serve the new demand.56 The process occurred
naturally. Lawyers within the New Deal used their tools and
influence to promote solutions to social problems that, of
course, privileged law and the courts.57 In contrast, although
it cannot be developed here, governmental leaders in France
and Great Britain in the same period built their welfare
states to diminish the influence of the legal profession and
the courts.58 The ties of the legal profession to the corporate
and propertied holders of wealth led reformers to find
solutions that did not give a privileged role to lawyers and
courts.59 There was no set of entrepreneurial academics and
lawyers to retool law and lawyers for the more activist
state.60
There were very similar challenges in the 1960s, which
Hilbink’s dissertation captures in the portrayal of the careers

56. Id. at 169–71.
57. See id.
58. See generally Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth, The Confrontation
Between the Big Five and Big Law: Turf Battles and Ethical Debates as Contests
for Professional Credibility, 29 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 615 (2004).
59. See SHAMIR, supra note 51, at 132–33.
60. See generally id.
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of Halpern, Hall, and others.61 These individuals, as noted,
were looking to become elite “lawyer-statespersons” in the
mold of their mentors.62 In the era of the late 1960s, however,
corporate law began to lose its appeal. It is telling that
Halpern began to feel increasingly attracted to activism and
disillusioned with his work for Arnold and Porter.63 In the
politicized world of the 1960s, the career for which he had
prepared himself had depreciated in value through the
attacks on law that served the status quo or, at best, very
slow change.64 The career lost some of its appeal for the socalled
best
and
brightest.
Again,
however,
entrepreneurialism within the profession led to a retooling
that adjusted to the new political and social setting.
These lawyers absorbed the activism around them and
developed a new elite solution. Working with others who
shared his position, Halpern came up with a proposal for
Ford Foundation funding of a Center for Law and Social
Policy.65 The same story occurred with Hall, who also became
disillusioned with corporate practice, again reflecting the
depreciation of the social status of that traditional path to
the elite.66 He joined with three others from O’Melveny and
Myers to work on a proposal to the Ford Foundation for a
Center for Law in the Public Interest.67 Both Halpern and
Hall’s group got funding for liberal public interest law firms
by the Ford Foundation—led by McGeorge Bundy, who
moved there from the White House.68 Bundy and the Ford
Foundation responded in part to these proposals because of

61. See generally Hilbink, supra note 46, at 342–50.
62. See id.
63. Id. at 345–46.
64. See id. at 332–42, 344–45.
65. AUERBACH, supra note 39, at 344–50.
66. Id. at 349–50.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 350, 354, 357, 376–77.
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their internalized commitment to the maintenance of the
elite role of lawyers moderating social change while serving
the state and business interests.69 They created liberal public
interest law firms, but they were not fundamentally opposed
to the power of corporate law firms.70 They ensured a close
connection between corporate lawyers and public interest
law firms by providing that board members must be
respectable corporate lawyers.71
Civil rights and employment discrimination law,
environmental law, and other new areas of regulation then
attracted ambitious and well-connected lawyers into elite
law, now expanded to include the leading public interest
organizations as well as corporate law firms.72 From the
point of view of the project of encouraging Ivy League and
comparable graduates to attend law school, it did not matter
whether they went to public interest law or corporate law—
even though for individuals it could represent an agonizing
personal choice. The point was the public interest law helped
to retool corporate law, keep the attractiveness of law school
for elite reproduction, and make it possible also for demand
creation fueling law firm prosperity—with the obvious
example of environmental law.
There are two more challenges that merit examination
and lead to the place where we are today. The first was the
challenge that is now represented in the dominance of
investment banking in the imagination of undergraduates in
the Ivy League. This phenomenon is also the challenge of the
M.B.A. to the J.D. The M.B.A. gained prestige more or less
equal to law in the 1980s, partly because of the deregulation
and intensified business competition that began around that

69. Id. at 356–59.
70. See id. at 364–69.
71. See id.
72. See id.

GARTH 65.2

306

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65

time.73 The second challenge is related to the changes in the
economy. It was the challenge of the political right—inspired
especially by neo-liberal economists—to the close
relationship of corporate law firms to the regulatory state
and relatively progressive law.
An interview that Yves Dezalay and I conducted in 2000
is indicative of the first challenge. We interviewed an
individual who was then a partner of Goldman Sachs.74 He
was a graduate from a leading law school and business
school. He had three summer jobs: McKinsey, Goldman
Sachs, and Cravath.75 He described the choice he ultimately
made between Goldman Sachs and Cravath as follows:
I found the work at Goldman . . . more challenging and stimulating and
more commercial and more rewarding, and I seemed to get more
responsibility quicker than I perceived to get at Cravath. . . . And I liked
the financial side as much as the legal side, because it seemed that the
financial side was driving things. And I would say that I was struck at
my summer at Cravath, working on a project with [another investment
bank]. . . , and how I thought the guys at Cravath were much smarter
than the guys at [the bank], but the guys at [the bank] were really calling
the shots. And that was an eye opener for me, because I really had no
exposure to investment banking growing up. In fact, I was very skeptical
when I got to business school, and met all the investment banking
analysts who were talking about how they were changing the world and
running deals.76

This individual’s father was a corporate lawyer and perfectly
understood the choice.77 His mother worried that he was
going into a trade rather than a profession.78
This interview could be used to posit a shift in the career

73. See generally YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE:
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL FIELD 151–81 (1996).
74. Dezalay & Garth, supra note 58, at 630.
75. As one of the interviewers, some of the information included here is from
my personal recollection of the interview.
76. Dezalay & Garth, supra note 58, at 630 (alterations in original).
77. Id. at 631.
78. Id.
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movement of those who earlier would simply have gone to the
corporate law firm, but the interview has another dimension
as well. The interviewee went on to note:
[O]ne thing which, you know, the U.S. [corporate law] firms basically
understand: that we’re staffed with very inexperienced people, who are
bright, but inexperienced. You know, if I hire, let’s say . . . [a lawyer at
a top U.S. firm], he’s probably the lawyer I’ve worked with the most over
the years, and who’s really, a, I think maybe the best lawyer I’ve ever
worked with. If I hire [him] on a project, and I’m not involved, I know
that [he] is there. And if one of my guys does something that they
shouldn’t, or is in over his head, I’m going to hear.79

The tight links between the investment banks and the law
firms allow for a division of labor in which the very junior
investment bankers can draw on the expertise and
experience of lawyers who know how to monitor the role the
investment bankers are supposed to play. They conspire to
“get the deal done” in the collective interests of an elite close
to economic power.80
There is another way that the rise of investment banks
and also business consultants complement the corporate law
firms. As demonstrated elsewhere, the model of the corporate
law firm inspired the other elite professional service firms.81
It is not a coincidence that investment bankers now go in and
out of government. Both competitors borrowed the
partnership model, the commitment to public service, and
the practice of hiring young talent primarily from the most
elite of the undergraduate institutions and business
schools—and also law schools. For a number of reasons,
therefore, the challenge from these organizational
competitors is not a zero-sum game for law firms. It is a
division of labor as well. The rise of McKinsey and other
business consultants in the 1980s went with a persistent
downsizing of corporations that generated considerable work
for corporate law firms, and the wave of mergers and
79. Id. (alterations in original).
80. Id. (quotations omitted).
81. Id. at 625.
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acquisitions generated new legalized technologies
business warfare such as the poison pill.82

of

The rise of these particular competitors, therefore, is not
inconsistent with maintaining the prominence of corporate
law firms and the demand for their services even though the
talent is shared by the elite organizations. The division of
labor means that the lawyers especially have a place as they
get older and accumulate expertise and judgment—
strengthening their opportunities also as corporate
statespersons.83 The mimicry of the corporate law firm model
akin to the creation of the Washington law firm in the 1930s
competes with and refurbishes the role of the corporate law
firm generally in the fields of economic and political power.
This pattern of challenge and absorption can be found
again with the recent challenge of the political right, which
is well-documented in the works of Ann Southworth, Stephen
Teles, and Amanda Hollis-Bruskey.84 Teles has a section of
an article entitled “Grassroots Without Elites: The
Conservative Legal Movement Circa 1980,” which is
especially germane to this story.85 As in the 1930s and in the
1960s, an ascending political movement—this time on the
right—found itself quite isolated from a legal establishment
that was invested in serving prevailing power structures.86
There was an attack on the role of elite law, the liberal
political role of many in corporate law firms, and the way
that liberals used courts as one part of their toolkit to
promote liberal social policies. The grassroots of the right did
82. Id. at 628.
83. See id. at 635.
84. See generally AMANDA HOLLIS-BRUSKY, IDEAS WITH CONSEQUENCES: THE
FEDERALIST SOCIETY AND THE CONSERVATIVE COUNTERREVOLUTION (2015); ANN
SOUTHWORTH, LAWYERS ON THE RIGHT: PROFESSIONALIZING THE CONSERVATIVE
COALITION (2008); Steven M. Teles, Transformative Bureaucracy: Regan’s
Lawyers and the Dynamics of Political Investment, 23 STUD. AM. DEV. 61 (2009).
85. Teles, supra note 84, at 63–66.
86. See supra note 84.
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not at first see a role for elite law in their movement. Not
surprisingly, the initial policies of the Reagan
administration were aimed at curtailing legal aid, public
interest law, and the role of the courts. But the situation
changed again through the entrepreneurialism of a new
generation.
The activities of the Federalist Society, the
entrepreneurialism of Edwin Meese and others, and the rise
of conservative foundations supporting allied public interest
law firms gain was transformative within the enduring
model. The result was the rise of elite conservative public
interest law and conservative activists as corporate lawyers
in the second Reagan administration.87 After that
administration, there were many more conservative elite
lawyers available to move into the elite legal academy and
the conservative public interest law firms, there were
respectable scholarly theories for lawyers on the right, and
there were openings for conservative pro bono attorneys in
large law firms. It was easy to find conservatives who were,
as Southworth quotes one of them, “the next generation of
Lloyd Cutlers and Joe Califanos who are prepared to run law
firms and to assume major government positions.”88 The mix
of conservative partners in law firms and conservative public
interest law firms created a role for elite corporate lawyers
that helped to maintain their position in the legal field and
in the field of state power.
Corporate law firms (now also corporate counsel) are
currently well positioned in the state and economy even
though there is a right and left establishment now—a
divided elite. There is another dimension to this comeback as
well. The Reagan era conservatives, as noted, wanted to get
the courts out of the way from the executive and legislative
branches. Legal doctrine was seen correctly as a reflection of

87. Teles, supra note 84, at 65.
88. SOUTHWORTH, supra note 84, at 39.
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the close relationship between corporate lawyers and the
regulatory state. Active courts were considered part of the
problem rather than a solution. Now the situation is
changed—once more reaffirming the position of elite
corporate law.
An anecdote reveals the changed situation. At an event
on the Supreme Court hosted at University of California,
Irvine School of Law in the summer of 2015, one of the
commentators responded to a question about whether the
Supreme Court was getting too liberal or too conservative
with activist jurisprudence. He stated that he asked his
conservative friends if they would trade Citizens United89 for
the case striking down the Defense of Marriage Act,90 and
that he asked his liberal friends the option the other way. It
seems, he noted, that both sides were content today with the
active role of the Supreme Court. And indeed, nearly every
major issue today comes before the Supreme Court—gay
marriage, Obamacare, elections, campaign finance, and
many more. This state of affairs is perfect for elite corporate
law firms.
An article on the Supreme Court Bar published by
Reuters examined who handled these major cases and found
that it was a very small group of specialists mainly situated
in large corporate law firms.91 “They are the elite of the elite:
Although they account for far less than 1 percent of lawyers
who filed appeals to the Supreme Court, these attorneys
were involved in 43 percent of the cases the high court chose
to decide from 2004 through 2012.”92 They provided
89. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2009) (holding that under the First
Amendment restrictions on corporate independent expenditures are
unconstitutional).
90. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
91. Joan Biskupic et al., The Echo Chamber: A Small Group of Lawyers and
Its Outsized Influence at the U.S. Supreme Court, REUTERS INVESTIGATES (Dec. 8,
2014, 10:30 AM), http://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/scotus/.
92. Id.
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a decided advantage for corporate America, and a growing insularity at
the court. Some legal experts contend that the reliance on a small cluster
of specialists, most working on behalf of businesses, has turned the
Supreme Court into an echo chamber—a place where an elite group of
jurists embraces an elite group of lawyers who reinforce narrow views of
how the law should be construed.93

Of course, the number of lawyers handling these cases is
small as a portion of the corporate bar. But they make the
case for the importance of the institution of the notable
corporate lawyer, exemplified by the conservative-liberal
alliance of Ted Olson and David Boies—both corporate
lawyers—in the case against the Defense of Marriage Act.94
And note that there is a place in this world also for the elite
public interest lawyer and elite law professor advocate, even
though the numbers of Supreme Court advocates are much
fewer than are found in the corporate bar. The Supreme
Court itself is also protected by both sides of the divided elite
from nominations of lawyers such as Harriet Myers,
condemned in large part for a non-elite pedigree.
From this perspective, the particular role of the
corporate legal elite in the U.S. state and economy is again
very strong. The pattern of elite lawyers brokering social
change by using the courts and serving at the intersection of
the state, the economy, and the academy is still with us. One
would expect that the social prominence of this role will
continue to attract a good portion of the best connected and
best performing undergraduates into the law. The structural
position of the corporate lawyer is still intact. As noted, that
role is in part challenged by investment bankers and
business consultants, but competition from those positions
also reinforces the elite role of corporate law and potentially
keeps corporate lawyers in a strong position to profit from
any innovations in corporate behavior produced by the

93. Id.
94. Jesse McKinley, Two Ideological Foes United to Overturn Proposition 8,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 10, 2010), https://mobile.nytimes.com/2010/01/11/us/11
prop8.html.
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consultants or bankers.
The strong structural position of corporate law firms,
and therefore elite law, does not necessarily mean increasing
demand for legal services or increasing law school
enrollments. Without the structural position, there would be
a major crisis for the role of law and lawyers. But the demand
for lawyer services—which fuels lawyer compensation and
feeds back into the number of applications to law school—
depends on much more than this structural position. As
many have pointed out in recent years, technological
innovation and the competition that commoditizes many
services put constant pressure on the corporate law firms
(and other service providers). Without new demand-creating
innovations in the corporate market, we can expect demand
to contract over time. But, historically, there have always
been innovations—such as big businesses suing other big
businesses in the 1980s95—that brought increased demand.
Such innovations have historically fueled the creation of
demand that might otherwise have been unexpected. It is not
surprising that in the Depression, and again as recently as
1990, conventional wisdom predicted a permanent relative
decline in the demand for legal services that did not
materialize.96 There may be a permanent decline, but a
projection of current trends oversimplifies the process of
demand creation.
There is no doubt a crisis in the sense of a decline in the
past several years in law school enrollments, and the decline
in the enrollments of those from the most elite

95. YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE: INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL
ORDER 33–37 (1996).
96. See Bryant G. Garth, Crises, Crises Rhetoric, and Competition in Legal
Education: A Sociological Perspective on the (Latest) Crisis of the Legal Profession
and Legal Education, 24 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 503, 506 (2013); Richard H.
Sander & E. Douglas Williams, Why Are There So Many Lawyers? Perspectives
on a Turbulent Market, 14 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 431 (1989).
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undergraduate institutions is an important part of the crisis
story.97 But if we look at the structural position of the
corporate law firm—and big law generally—the situation
looks much less troubling. Certainly there are other aspects
to this story, but the position of the corporate law firm is one
key dimension that so far remains strong
I also do not want to make a normative argument, but I
want to note there are two aspects of this “success” story of
corporate law for more than a century in attracting top talent
and finding ways to re-adapt to maintain its strong position.
One is that the strong role of law is maintained in part
because of the social importance of leading lawyers,
including especially lawyer-statespersons of the corporate
law firms. Neither the New Deal, the rise of the left, nor the
rise of the right—despite initial challenges—pushed aside
the role of corporate lawyers and their connections to
corporate and philanthropic power, elite law schools, elite
positions in the judiciary, and key positions in state power.
This success of law, however, is also success in containing the
power of social movements by linking them to an evolving
establishment that reproduces itself through the process of
containment. At the end of the day, corporate lawyers and
their clients survive potential threats to their position as
social change movements are moderated and absorbed
through elite reproduction. Elite law does not lead social
change. It adapts to it and contains it.
III. ACCESS TO UPWARD MOBILITY, THE URBAN LAW SCHOOLS,
AND THE CHALLENGE FROM RELATIVELY ELITE LAW
The story of law as an upward mobility career is related
to the story of the demand for legal services in the United
States. In countries where access to a legal career is limited,
and especially where career paths are relatively rigid, there

97. Rampell, supra note 24.
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is less innovation in fueling new demands for legal services.98
The entrepreneurial ability of the U.S. law firm, as Lawrence
Friedman has noted, stems in part from the relative
openness of the legal profession.99 Of course, that openness
is relative. Minorities and women did not traditionally have
access to legal careers, and corporate law firms were long the
preserve of WASP elites.
The history is again important. Prior to the development
of corporate law firms, the legal profession in the United
States was already relatively open in terms of at least social
class. Individuals did not even need a degree to become a
lawyer. The law school only gradually became the chief
means for gaining access to a legal career, and as law schools
increased in importance, a growing number of urban law
schools began to provide access to immigrants and others
that the existing university law schools did not serve. Robert
Stevens observed that the number of law students and law
schools went from 1200 students and 21 schools in 1870 to
4500 students and 61 schools in 1890 to 22,000 students and
140 law schools in 1916.100 The YMCA was one of the chief
sources for the new law schools established over this period,
establishing some nineteen schools by 1927.101 The
combination of night classes and low tuition made these
schools quite attractive to the children of immigrants in the
major cities. From 1920 to 1940, largely because of these
groups, the lawyer population increased by fifty percent to

98. See Yves Dezalay and Bryant Garth, Hegemonic Battles, Professional
Rivalries, and the International Division of Labor in the Market for the Import
and Export of State-Governing Expertise, 5 INT’L POL. SOC. 276, 281–85 (2011).
99. Friedman, supra note 12, at 484.
100. ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION
1850S TO THE 1980S, at 76 (1983).
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101. Dorothy E. Finnegan, Raising and Leveling the Bar: Standards, Access,
and the YMCA Evening Law Schools, 1890–1940, at 55 J. LEGAL EDUC. 208, 209
(2005).
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181,000.102
The increase was not without its critics, whose rhetoric
is still quite familiar sounding. According to Jerold
Auerbach, “[f]or years the tradition of virtually free access to
the bar had troubled lawyers who watched uneasily while
immigration and urbanization transformed the nation and
their profession.”103 Complaints included overcrowding in
the profession and the poor ethics of the immigrant
lawyers.104 Auerbach noted further that “notions of the
profession as an accessible democratizing institution which
fostered social mobility became suspect once the origins of its
newest members changed.”105 The bar’s reaction was to try
to raise academic standards including mandating college
attendance. The attack on the immigrants, he noted, also
deflected attention from the role of the bar in resisting social
reform.106 Criticism of the corporate law firms and the legal
elite could be refocused on reforming the so-called lower
ranks.
Professors of the university law schools—in part working
through the AALS—allied with the ABA leadership against
the urban law schools: “perhaps the strongest attraction of
an alliance was the boost it would give their own efforts to
beat back the night law schools, whose enrollments
continued to climb.”107 The Reed Report by the Carnegie
Foundation, which came out in 1920, was part of this process
of pushing back against the night law schools.108 Reed
102. AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA NATIONAL LAWYER POPULATION SURVEY: HISTORICAL
TREND IN TOTAL NATIONAL LAWYER POPULATION 1878–2016 (2016),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/market_research/t
otal-national-lawyer-population-1878-2016.authcheckdam.pdf.
103. AUERBACH, supra note 39, at 106.
104. Id. at 106–07.
105. Id. at 108.
106. Id. at 108–09.
107. Id. at 109.
108. Id. at 110.
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recognized the access role of the night law schools, but he
criticized them especially as “cheapened copies” of the
university law schools, and he proposed that the profession
simply be divided into two kinds of lawyer.109 There would be
probate, trial, and criminal work for those who went to the
night schools, and business practice for those who went to
the university schools—differentiation by the “economic
status of the client.”110 In 1921, two pillars of the corporate
legal elite, Elihu Root and William Howard Taft, used the
Reed Report to try to raise standards sufficiently to stop the
entrance of “incompetent practitioners” into the
profession.111 The requirement of at least two years of college
was the main vehicle they used to try to restrict admission
and diminish the enrollments of the urban law schools.112
The Depression of the 1930s accelerated the attack on
the urban and night law schools.113 The economic crisis of the
bar prompted calls to close down the night law schools on the
basis of their low quality, the poor ethics of those seeking
upward mobility through law, and an oversupply of
lawyers.114 The method again was to try to upgrade the
credentials required to attend law school and also to upgrade
the requirements for law school accreditation.115 The night
and urban law schools had enough support in the legal
profession and the government generally to resist the attack.
Indeed, the ranks of the profession continued to grow at a
fairly steady pace, although it slowed after 1960 (until
picking up again in the 1970s with the expansion of
109. Id. at 111 (quotations omitted).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 113 (quotations omitted).
112. SUSAN K. BOYD, THE ABA’S FIRST SECTION: ASSURING A QUALIFIED BAR 21–
27 (1995), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/misc/legal_
education/1993_abas_first_section.pdf.
113. Garth, supra note 96, at 506–09.
114. AUERBACH, supra note 39, at 106–07.
115. Id.
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opportunities to minorities and especially women).116
The “two-hemisphere” thesis of Heinz and Laumann,
based on a study of Chicago lawyers, captures the division of
the legal profession in the 1970s.117 Their book Chicago
Lawyers highlights the higher status of the corporate law
firms characterized by lawyers who attended elite schools,
were largely WASP males, and represented only corporations
rather than individuals.118 They note the lower earnings,
prestige, and credentials of those who serve individuals.119
Their focus on the status differential is understandable, but
it tends to downplay the achievement of the urban law
schools in building up their own hemisphere.120 The urban
law schools, exemplified in Chicago by Loyola, DePaul, John
Marshall, and Chicago-Kent, were already deeply embedded
in urban government—at that time, the Daley Machine.121
They occupied key positions as state—not federal—
prosecutors, public defenders, judges, and municipal
lawyers.122 They were also litigators.123 They made a virtue
out of necessity and built strong self-help networks outside
of the corporate bar.124
The combination of judges, litigation, and democratic
politics in Chicago, for one notable example, accounts in
large part for the rise of the personal injury bar there (with
parallel developments elsewhere). For example, bright
graduates of Loyola in the 1950s would find a place in the

116. Sander & Williams, supra note 96, at 436.
117. See generally JOHN P. HEINZ & EDWARD O. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS:
THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR 182–93 (1982).
118. Id. at 182–93.
119. Id. at 127–34.
120. See id.
121. Id. at 11.
122. Id. at 274–77.
123. Id.
124. Id.
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government or in small firms, since the corporate firms were
not open to them.125 Some of them did the work necessary to
overturn—through judicial and governmental assistance—
the limitations on what juries could award and what one
needed to prove to win damages for personal injury. The
biography of Philip Corboy, who was listed as one of the key
“notables” in the network of the Chicago bar, illustrates
exactly how the urban lawyers evolved over time.126 While
never achieving the status of the elite corporate lawyer, the
elite of the personal injury bar—still mainly educated in the
urban law schools—earn huge amounts of money and play a
major role in politics at all levels.127
Other research shows how the urban law schools, in
particular the Catholic ones such as DePaul and Loyola,
gained a foothold in the corporate law firms and gradually
expanded the opportunities for the network of graduates
from those schools in the corporate law firms.128 The
networks helped recruit and promote success in those firms
for those without the elite credentials traditionally
required.129 Ted Seto of Loyola in Los Angeles has
documented more recently the surprising number of Loyola
and Southwestern graduates in the partnership ranks of the
Los Angeles corporate law firms.130 As discussed below,
many of them did not begin their careers in those law firms.
The After the JD (AJD) cohort that began practice in
2000 showed this phenomenon of a relative openness among
large law firms to graduates with top grades from the urban
125. Sara Parikh & Bryant Garth, Philip Corboy and the Construction of the
Plaintiffs’ Personal Injury Bar, 30 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 269, 275–77 (2005).
126. Id. at 270–71.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 276; see Bryant Garth & Joanne Martin, Law Schools and the
Construction of Competence, 43 J. LEGAL EDUC. 469, 482–88 (1993).
129. See id. at 276–77.
130. Theodore P. Seto, Where Do Partners Come From?, 62 J. LEGAL EDUC. 242,
243–44, 253 (2012).
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law schools and, indeed, the non-elite law schools more
generally.131 The potential urban law school advantage was
the availability of critical masses within local corporate law
firms of graduates from local law schools, which could
increase the pressure on hiring committees to interview and
hire graduates from their schools.132 The AJD project showed
also that there was much greater recruitment from the elite
and relatively elite law schools, but the process at the time
was at least relatively open.133
The Great Recession of 2009 brought a renewed effort to
attack the upward mobility project of law schools by
attacking the category of neither night law schools, nor
urban law schools, but rather the more general category of
lower-ranked law schools.134 One strain of the critique is, as
noted above, that the divide proposed by the Reed report
should be formalized akin to some of the divisions one finds
in Europe. In this case, the upward mobility project would
primarily be represented by individuals who would attend
two-year law schools, pay lower tuition, and be taught by
faculty with little or no research agendas.135 They would
again do the probate, family law, criminal law, and civil
practice contemplated by the Reed Report.136 They would not
represent large corporations and certainly would not gain
access to corporate law firms. The two hemispheres of the
1960s would be strengthened, and yet, it is not clear if the
two-year graduates would even continue to get the positions
in local government as prosecutors or public defenders.
131. See RONIT DINOVITZER ET AL., AFTER THE JD: FIRST RESULTS OF A NATIONAL
STUDY OF LEGAL CAREERS 19, 25–27 (2012) (showing employment by large law
firms generally of top students from third and fourth tier law schools).
132. Sterling, Dinovitzer & Garth, supra note 15, at 407–08.
133. DINOVITZER ET AL., supra note 131, at 42, 79.
134. See Garth, supra note 96, at 505; Rebecca Roiphe, Tilting at Stratification:
Against a Divide in Legal Education, 16 NEV. L.J. 227, 230 (2015).
135. See TAMANAHA, supra note 18, at 20–21.
136. AUERBACH, supra note 39, at 111.
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Unlike in the 1930s, the culprit now is not the ethics of
the bar, but rather the costs of law school, the debt loads of
those who attend law school and lack access to the corporate
bar, and, more recently, the LSAT scores of applicants to
lower-ranked law schools. As noted elsewhere, the most elite
law schools today, in contrast to the 1920s and 1930s, are not
active participants in this debate.137 Law schools above the
lower tiers, but not at the elite level, have led the charge,
including: faculty from Washington University, St. Louis;
Indiana University, Bloomington; University of Tennessee,
and Vanderbilt.138 They have been joined by the American
Bar Association.
The ABA Section on Legal Education appears to have reembraced the role from the 1930s against the urban law
schools and lower-ranked schools more generally. The idea is
that there are too many lawyers, particularly from lowerranked schools.139 Antitrust law as interpreted by the Justice
Department in the 1980s prevents closing law schools in
order to restrict competition, but the Section is promoting a
crude tool which, in terms of predicted outcome, is designed
to accomplish that exact agenda.140 The proposal has two
aspects. One is to require that seventy-five percent of the
graduates of a law school pass the bar within two years.141
The other is to presumptively limit law school attrition that
occurs other than through transfer to twenty percent.142 The
137. See Garth, supra note 96, at 515.
138. See BARTON, supra note 21, at 153–54; CAMPOS, supra note 17, at 67–78;
Garth, supra note 96, at 515.
139. There is also within the ABA a Task Force on the Future of the Legal
Profession and a Task Force on the Costs of Legal Education. See Am. Bar Ass’n,
Task Force on the Financing of Legal Education, at 59 (June 17, 2015),
www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_education/committees/about-task-force-onthe-financing-of-legal-education.html.
140. Memorandum from Rebecca White Berch & Barry A. Currier, supra note
7.
141. Id.
142. Id.
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proposed reform has gained widespread support among
deans of leading law schools, and the legal press has even
criticized it as not going far enough.143 Deans of lower-ranked
schools with high minority enrollments have understandably
been critical, citing the potential impact on diversity. The
rhetoric of the proponents from higher ranked schools is
instructive.
An article in the ABA Journal quotes Deborah Merritt of
Ohio State Law School:
While diversity is an important goal, minority law students deserve to
attend law schools that will position them for successful legal careers,
Merritt wrote in her letter supporting the change. “Maintaining the
accreditation of law schools with poor bar passage rates, on the contrary,
is a counterproductive way to diversify the profession,” Merritt wrote.
“We owe minority students the best our education system has to offer—
not programs with low success rates.”144

Daniel Rodriguez and Craig Boise, Deans of
Northwestern and Syracuse, have defended the new proposal
as follows in the National Law Journal:
In this difficult economic climate for law graduates, the challenge for law
schools is twofold. First, schools must commit to creative strategies to
bring in able students who will thrive in law school, pass the bar, and
move on to meaningful and successful careers. This is at least as
important with regard to students of color as everyone else in the
student community.
Second, they must develop mechanisms of student support and academic

143. E.g., Daniel Rodriguez & Craig Boise, A Tightened Bar Passage Standard
Is Needed, NAT’L L.J. (Sept. 19, 2016), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/
commentary/id=1202767658112/A-Tightened-Bar-Passage-Standard-is-Needed
?mcode=1202615496053&curindex=1&slreturn=20170010134405.
See
also
Vikram Amar, First Monday Musings by Dean Vik Amar: Thoughts on the ABA’s
Proposed Tightening on Bar Pass Standards, ABOVE L. (Dec. 5, 2016),
http://abovethelaw.com/2016/12/first-monday-musings-by-dean-vik-amarthoughts-on-the-abas-proposed-tightening-of-bar-pass-standards/.
But
see
Austen Parrish, Dean’s Desk: A Troubling Focus by the ABA on the Bar Exam,
IND. LAW. (Nov. 16, 2016), http://www.theindianalawyer.com/deans-desk-atroubling-focus-by-the-aba-on-the-bar-exam/PARAMS/article/42025.
144. Karen Sloan, Diversity, Consumer Groups at Odds over Tougher Bar-Pass
Rule Proposed for Law Schools, LAW (Aug. 2, 2016), http://www.law.com/
sites/almstaff/2016/08/02/diversity-consumer-groups-at-odds-over-tougher-barpass-rule-proposed-for-law-schools/.
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assistance to measurably increase the bar passage rates of students.
That most law schools have been able to do precisely that over the long
run indicates that a high bar-exam passage standard can be met. A law
school that cannot or will not meet this criterion should not be permitted
to continue to operate with the imprimatur of ABA accreditation.
The consequence of maintaining the status quo on this issue is
distressing: students with a demonstrably small likelihood of success
will continue to pay tuition to unscrupulous law schools. The ABA
Section of Legal Education should be commended, not criticized, for its
efforts to require greater accountability from the law schools it
accredits.145

The quotations focus on the issue of what the proposed
bar passage standard will do for diversity, but the issue is
more general. From the position of higher ranked schools, the
question is about bringing in students with appropriately
high credentials and also creating programs to pass the bar
exam. Schools with low bar passage, high debt, and relatively
low employment ten months after graduation are termed
“unscrupulous.”146 While not said explicitly, the suggestion
is that they are undermining the prestige of law schools and
the legal profession generally. The proposed deflected
solution to the crisis—again as in the 1930s—is to purge a
portion of the lower-ranked law schools.147
The California law schools are especially at risk because
of the relatively low cut score used in California. A bar exam
score that fails in California may very well succeed in
Illinois, Minnesota, or other states with different cut rates.
The most recent bar results from the July 2016 examination
make this concern more than academic.148 Only five of the
twenty-one ABA accredited law schools in California beat the
seventy-five percent, although ten of the schools below that
figure will certainly get seventy-five percent within two
145. Rodriguez & Bosie, supra note 143.
146. See id.
147. Garth, supra note 96, at 517.
148. Staci Zaretsky, California Bar Exam Results by Law School (2016), ABOVE
L. (Dec. 13, 2016, 1:15 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2016/12/california-bar-examresults-by-law-school-2016/.
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years; but seven schools were below fifty percent, and they
will be challenged by the new standards if they go into
effect.149 The challenge the lower-ranked schools face is even
greater. They are told that they need programs to improve
bar passage. In the words of Rodriguez and Boise, “they must
develop mechanisms of student support and academic
assistance to measurably increase the bar passage rates of
students. That most law schools have been able to do
precisely that over the long run indicates that a high barexam passage standard can be met.”150
Yet for lower-ranked schools, especially in California,
there is no evidence that any law school has been able to
consistently perform better on the bar exam than would have
been predicted by their entering class credentials.151 All the
schools have many more personnel dedicated to academic
support than in the past, but the success of those programs
over time is unclear. One reason for the lack of comparative
success is that they are competing with each other in an arms
race, but even so, if the programs were demonstrably
effective, the Bar Examiners might then acknowledge that
the pool of exams is better as a whole, which they have not
done. The only way low-ranked access-oriented law schools
can consistently improve bar passage is through attrition of
low performing students, but the putative twenty percent
cap also limits that strategy, which is tough on students in
any event.152 In addition, attrition among the high
performing students, who transfer to higher ranked law
schools, also lowers the bar passage rate, since they are
counted as part of the school to which they transfer.153
149. Id.
150. Rodriguez & Boise, supra note 143.
151. David Frank, Some Thoughts on the California Bar Exam, FAC. LOUNGE
(Dec. 14, 2016), http://www.thefacultylounge.org/2016/12/some-thoughts-on-thecalifornia-bar-exam-.html.
152. Sloan, supra note 144.
153. Id.
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The choice of the cut score on an exam, which, it is clear,
does not test what makes a good lawyer, is taken as a given
in most of this debate. There is the hope that a national bar
examination might lessen the differential and at least allow
people to use a score to move to another state where the score
will pass. The critical problem now is that low ranked law
schools and the urban schools that I have emphasized here
face the challenge that, in today’s world, they are admitting
students with lower LSAT scores than in the past. We do not
know if these individuals who make it through law school are
doomed to be bad lawyers or should be denied admission. We
know only that they will have a harder time on the bar
exams, especially those with high cut rates. We also know
that those attending the urban law schools today as in the
past are more likely to be relatively poor, to speak English as
a second language, and to be the first in a family to attend
law school.154
The question under today’s conditions is whether the
accreditation standards should make it impossible for many
of these upwardly mobile students to attend law schools,
such as the urban ones, that tend to lead to good, if not highly
lucrative, careers.155 One argument for denying them is that
not enough of these students have law jobs ten months after
graduation, 156 but that is a very poor indicator of the value
of a law degree.157 The second argument is that their debt is

154. Sterling, Dinovitzer & Garth, supra note 15, at 403–05.
155. See generally id. at 405–08, 411–14; Jane Yakovitz, Marooned: An
Empirical Investigation of Law School Graduates Who Fail the Bar Exam, 60 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 3 (2010).
156. Simkovic & McIntyre refer to statistics collected nine months after
graduation. The ABA now collects these statistics ten months after graduation.
157. See Simkovic & McIntyre, supra note 11, at 23. The work of Simcovic and
McIntyre makes a strong case for the career value of a law degree, which does
not depend on first position; and Simkovic suggests also that the job alleged to be
the preserve of those who cannot get jobs, solo practice, is actually more lucrative
than the critics assert. Michael Simkovic, A Few Problems with Coverage of the
Solo Practitioner Income Debates, BRIAN LEITER’S L. SCH. REP. (Aug. 11, 2016),
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too high, but again this is not an issue unique to law schools,
and the general data suggest that the debt issue is
overblown.158 The cost is a major issue, but again there is a
question of whether those seeking upward mobility should be
stopped and denied access according to the proposition that
law is “not for them.”
The preceding paragraphs do not pretend to resolve the
debates about debt, the appropriate standards for admission
to law school, and the vicissitudes of early careers for law
school graduates. The point is that the current debate and
recipes for reform are extremely one-sided, as in the 1930s.
Those in the relatively higher status law schools have shaped
the debate and the media reporting while ignoring or
downplaying uncertainties and counter arguments. Every
issue is resolved against the lower-ranked schools.
As in the 1930s, it appears that the prosperity of urban
law schools committed to upward mobility is threatened. The
threat comes especially from the relatively more elite law
schools and their allies, who are themselves under a
somewhat different threat. The elite law schools are
challenged by a relative decline in what they see as the “best
and brightest,” meaning those with the resources and
background to bring elite credentials to their law school
applications. That group, according to my argument here, is
indeed essential to maintaining the important position of law
in the United States. My argument is also that the urban law
schools and, in general, the law schools that provide access
to the disadvantaged are equally part of what is essential to
keep generating new demands and new positions for law and
lawyers.
Many within the elite circles of legal education are not
very sympathetic to the urban law schools, characterized as
http://leiterlawschool.typepad.com/leiter/2016/08/a-few-problems-with-coverageof-the-solo-practitioner-income-debates.html.
158. SANDY BAUM, STUDENT DEBT: RHETORIC
EDUCATION FINANCING 4–7 (2016).
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unscrupulous for taking on students with low application
credentials. Nevertheless, as stated earlier, I believe the
success of the urban law schools is vital to the success of the
legal profession in the United States. Clearly the schools
have played a major and complementary role to the more
elite schools in the past. The argument today can be
summarized as follows.
The first point is that without the urban law schools
many relatively disadvantaged students, immigrants, and
children of immigrants, simply will not go to law school and
become lawyers. The urban schools are the major points of
entry for this group of students, and their application
credentials will be far from those of the elite schools. The
credentials have fallen recently, but there is no reason to see
that decline as inevitable.
Second, despite the attitude of many of the more elite
legal educators, the legitimacy of the legal profession can be
challenged if the claim for equal justice depends on elite
corporate law on one side and elite public interest law on the
other. The examples of Britain and France in the Depression
suggest that during times of social ferment, a legal profession
too identified with the elite establishment may lose influence
and stature. Many of the lawyers that brought law to leftist
movements in the 1960s, and to the right in the 1980s, came
from lower-ranked law schools in touch with grassroots
political movements.159 Only later did the elite capitalize on
and gain a strong position within these movements.
Third, a similar point is that the relative openness of the
U.S. legal profession fosters innovation that redounds to the
success of the profession as a whole—new demand creation.
Examples from the past include litigation as a business
strategy, corporate bankruptcy, corporate immigration, and
the development of plaintiffs’ personal injury and class

159. See generally SOUTHWORTH, supra note 84; Teles, supra note 84, at 3;
Hilbink, supra note 46, at 265–67.
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action practice. Most of these start outside the corporate law
context and then become mainstays of corporate law firm
growth. These examples also move individuals with
expertise—who often graduated from non-elite schools—in
those practices into strong positions within corporate law
firms.
More recently, borrowing from the qualitative interviews
of the After the JD Project, we see careers made up out of
linguistic, ethnic, and national origins experiences.160 The
impact of these examples is notable. One interviewee went to
a relatively low-ranked law school, practiced intellectual
property for a while, and then built a practice serving
engineers from his Islamic community. He was very
successful and accordingly, mosques began to ask him how
to handle threatening requests from governmental entities.
His work in all aspects brought Muslim Americans in touch
with the law and the law in touch with their issues. The
access issue in this respect is also a social control issue,
which brings disputes and conflicts into the law.161
CONCLUSION: COMPLEMENTARY BROKERS AND THE FUTURE
OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION
The strong position of law in the United States puts
lawyers in a position to participate in economic, social, and
cultural movements and changes. My argument in this
article is that this strong position depends on the success of
corporate law firms, as the embodiment of the elite, and
urban law schools, as the embodiment of the upward mobility
project. The two sides are related. They fight as part of the
legal field. Relatively elite law schools use the urban, as well
160. Ronit Dinovitzer & Bryant G. Garth, Lawyer Satisfaction in the Process of
Structuring Legal Careers, 41 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 1, 4–5 (2007); Bryant G. Garth
& Joyce Sterling, Exploring Inequality in the Corporate Law Firm
Apprenticeship: Doing the Time, Finding the Love, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1361
(2009).
161. Dinovitzer & Garth, supra note 160, at 4–5.
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as other lower-ranked law schools, in order to enhance their
relative prestige and promote “reforms,” which make
existence of the urban law schools more precarious. Many
graduates of the urban law schools, especially those who
dominate the plaintiffs’ bar, thrive by challenging corporate
law firms through mass torts and class actions.
Each side serves as a kind of broker connecting law to
social movements, economic power, politics, and people. The
combination also promotes an entrepreneurialism in the
interests of the legal profession and both institutions. The
success to date of the legal profession in the United States
has depended on the success of both sides. If demand is going
to be maintained or augmented in the future, it will come
from this entrepreneurial and broker relationship.
Challenges to either institution are challenges to the position
of the legal profession.

